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Jam aica Under Seaga:
1981-1983

26

By Linus A. Hoskins

rime Minister [Edward] Seaga
viewed his [1980] election as “a
declaration against Commu
nism in Jamaica” and promised
a moderate government following a
nonaligned policy of good relations
with all.1 Describing his party’s victory
in the October 30, 1980 general elec
tions as “an overwhelming mandate by
the people of Jamaica,” the prime
minister has insisted that the victory
enabled his government to “give the
people the policies and programmes
necessary to restore the economy.” In
his first official address to the people,
he said:

P

. .. We hope to offer, in this new era of
our political life, the people o f famaica a
principled government. We hope to offer
the people o f Jamaica in this new era
creative government. We hope to offer a
government o f sanity. We hope to offer a
government that knows where it is going
and can say so with conviction and with
credibility. We hope to offer a govern
ment that will not have hostile relations
with the international fora o f the world,
but will have good relations with the
international community of nations and
we hope to offer a government that has
no quarrel within our domestic situation
with those particular segments o f our
society which are the roots o f our demo
cratic system and our constitutional proc
ess . . . 2
According to some political observ
ers, Seaga’s landslide election victory
represented “a mandate for (his) free
enterprise programmes and a rejection
of the socialist experiment of the
former Michael Manley administra
tion, which was accused of spreading
poverty instead of wealth”.3
The prime minister has indicated
that his victory and similar conserNEW DIRECTIONS X T O B E R 1985

vative swings in the Caribbean were “a
message that we are ready to contain
the expansion of Cubanism” and that
the move away from the influence of
the Soviet Union and Cuba has gained
momentum because of economic mis
management under socialist regimes.
Seaga has said that another reason that
Cubanism has failed to win support in
the Caribbean was due to socialism’s
“ ideological incompatibility” with
Caribbean peoples’ thinking and he
reassured Jamaicans that with his elec
toral victory they were now “free of
ideological adventurism”.
. . .The economic and ideological mis
adventure o f the Marxist system was not
acceptable to a people accustomed to the
lifestyle and expectations of the market
system. . . 4
As an unabashed proponent of the
free enterprise system, Seaga is con
vinced that Jamaica’s bread is buttered
in Washington and not, as his pred
ecessor seemed to believe, in Havana
or Moscow. As a result, he wasted no
time in reversing Jamaica’s political
course in order to undo the damage
which, he charges, has been caused by
eight years of mismanagement and ex
perimentation with Cuban-type solu
tions.5
In the foreign policy area, the Seaga
administration is staunchly anti-Communist and stresses that its “first
priority is to re-establish confidence in
Jamaica as a stable pro-Western na
tion”. According to the government’s
election manifesto, its policy is to halt
what it sees as “the expansionist
movement of Communist imperialism”
and to “combat the threat of alien ideol
ogies” in the region.
On the issue of nonalignment, unlike
the Manley administration, the Seaga
administration not only does not intend
to play an aggressive role in the move

ment but is also determined not to take
a “high profile in any single direction” .
By adopting this “constructive role”,
the administration seeks to avoid “the
advocacy of one cause or the other
which could prejudice (its) ability to
conciliate” its own national interests.
he Seaga administration is also
determined to stymie the
“ in te rfe re n c e of foreign
pow ers in (its) dom estic
affairs” and guided by the “greater
principle of moral judgement”, it has
vowed always to commit itself “to the
struggle against racist regimes, wher
ever they may be” and likewise those
“regimes which violate human rights.”
The government is also adamantly
against “ racist oppression and
colonialism.” According to the govern
ment’s manifesto:

T

. . . We support liberation movements
against racism, oppression and colonial
ism. We do not accept that liberation
movements can justify our support in any
country whose nationals freely vote to
establish or continue any political rela
tionship. Nor do we support expansionist
movements operating under the guise of
liberation movements; and we condemn
all the disguised attempts to infiltrate
and exploit any country. . . 6

obsession with the spread of “Com- 27
munist im perialism” is directed
tow ard C astro ’s Cuba. Indeed,
throughout the 1980 campaign, Seaga
threatened the Cubans by warning that
they would not be welcomed “if they
are becoming involved in (Jamaica’s)
domestic politics” and are bent on ex
porting revolution to the region.
. . .I f Castro wants to be accepted in
this region, then he must be able to prove
his credentials by not exporting revolu
tion or ideology. We are rather firm in
our belief that he exported revolution to
Greruida, and. . .to Nicaragua. We
believe that Cuban expansionism will con
tinue through its role as a proxy for the
Soviet Union. The Cubans set up Jamaica
as their espionage center o f the Caribbean
so they could have easier access to subver
sives on other islands, who could come
here to deal with them rather than going
to Havana and risking exposure. How can
you normalize relations with a country
acting like that. . . ?7

To demonstrate that he meant busi
ness, Seaga’s first act as prime minister
was to expel Cuban Ambassador Ulises
Estrada, who left Jamaica on Novem
ber 3, 1980 along with several other
Cubans. In addition to the accusation
that Cuba was “instrumental in smug
gling arms and ammunition into
And finally, with regard to regional Jamaica” during the 1980 election cam
interests, the [Seaga] administration paign, the Seaga government specifical
regards the Caribbean as its “natural ly accused Estrada of being involved in
area of interest” with emphasis placed a scheme that illegally shipped 200,000
on the role of CARICOM, the Carib shotgun shells and .38 caliber pistol am
bean Bank and the University of the munition to Jamaica from Miami and of
West Indies (UWI). Its overall policy stockpiling M-16 rifles in the Cuban
position on the Caribbean is that “with Embassy—rifles which were allegedly
closer cooperation for mutual benefit”, used to attack supporters of the
Caribbean governments “can halt the Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) and the
expansionist movement of Communist security forces.8
imperialism operating under the
In January 1981, the Jamaican gov
pretext of a liberation movement.”
ernment terminated the “brigadista”
Prime Minister Seaga’s paranoid program and immediately recalled all
NEW DIRECTIONS OCTOBER 1985

Jamaican students who were in Cuba tion member of Parliament D.K. Dun
under the program. According to a can for “behaving in a manner pre
State Department report, under the judicial to the national interest.” The
“brigadista” program, Cuba “trained government’s Minister of National
about 1,400 Jamaican youths in Cuba as S ecurity and Ju stice, W inston
construction workers.” Furthermore, Spaulding, accused Duncan of making
“political indoctrination in Cuba formed public statements “supportive of a
part of this group’s curriculum” during foreign power with which Jamaica had
which the “youths received military severed diplomatic connections for
training while in Cuba, including in behaving in a manner prejudicial to
struction in revolutionary tactics and Jamaica’s interest and particularly in
respect to the island’s security.” The
use of arms.”9
government’s position was that by sen
n October 29, 1981, after one
ding the top-level delegation to Cuba,
year in office, the Seaga
administration did the ultimate
by breaking diplomatic rela
tions with Cuba, claiming that Havana
When he became prime
had sheltered/harbored criminals
wanted for prosecution by police in minister in 1980, Edward
Jamaica.10
Seaga stated that he
And in December 1982, the Jamaican inherited a nation that
government refused to extend the work
permit of Cuban journalist Godefroid was ‘lurching from crisis
Tchamlesso, who had been covering to crisis’.
the Caribbean for eight years as chief
correspondent for Prensa Latina. No
reasons were given by the government
for denying the extension.
Needless to say, the Jamaican gov
ernment’s decision to sever diplomatic
relations with Cuba in 1981 was greeted the PNP “appeared willing to subor
with indignation by opposition parties, dinate the interests of Jamaica to those
both in and out of Jamaica, and by the of Cuba.”14
Cuban government. In fact, as a riposte
Indeed the PNP was not the only
to the government’s bizarre, diplomatic political faction in Jamaica that rejected
action, Jamaica’s opposition People’s the government’s diplomatic break with
National Party [PNP] Vice-President Cuba. In an opinion poll conducted in
and former Foreign Affairs Minister December 1981, “ a majority of
Percival Patterson headed a high-level Jamaicans disagree(d) with the Seaga
delegation which left for Havana on government’s break in diplomatic ties
November 11, 1981 “to discuss with with Cuba.” The poll, which was con
Cuban officials the recent break of ducted by JLP supporter political scien
diplomatic relations with Cuba by the tist Carl Stone, indicated a 48 percent
government of Prime Minister Edward disagreement with the decision, while
Seaga” 11 and “to consolidate long 41 percent favored the action. Eleven
standing relations between the PNP percent had no opinion. The same poll
and the communist party of Cuba”.12 also revealed:
The PNP condemned the government’s
. . . as many as 21 percent o f the ruling
decision, arguing that the government
“had tendered no evidence that the JLP’s own supporters did not endorse the
men were in Cuba” and suggested that government’s action. And among the
“several steps could have been taken to opposition PNP supporters, some 91 per
show displeasure short of severing rela cent of those interviewed were solidly
tions”. The PNP also called on the gov behhid their party’s stand in objecting to
ernment “to allow freedom of move the break in diplomatic relations with
ment to all Jamaicans wishing to visit Cuba. The poll disclosed that JLP sup
porters and “independent opinion” were
Cuba”.13
For its part, the government brought against the break largely because of the
a parliamentary censure motion against (spurious reasons advanced by the govern
PNP’s General Secretary and opposi ment. . . 15

O
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he Cuban government categori
cally denied the Jamaican
government’s charges that it
harbored criminals wanted by
police in Jamaica. Cuba responded by
charging that the break in diplomatic
relations “was carried out by the
government of Seaga but was decreed
in Washington.. .as one more step in
the Yankee government’s aggressive
anti-Cuban strategy.” The Cuban
government also accused Seaga of
attempting to be “the most loquacious
leading choir boy of imperialism in the
Caribbean”.

T

Domestic Policy

The cardinal features of the Seaga
administration’s supply-side economic
philosophy are that “the private sector
must save the country and that market
forces would be allowed to have full
play”.16 The government is guided by
the belief that “the first lesson is that
Socialism cannot produce economic
growth” and that after eight years of
Socialist policies which virtually turned
Jamaica into a “giant slum”, the only
prescription that can restore economic
vitality is an economy “which rewards
personal initiative and enterprise.” The
specifics of this new philosophy are
(i) reliance on the private sector (free
enterprise) and foreign investment to be
the “leader in the country’s economic
development” (ii) deregulation of the
economy and (iii) an export-oriented
structural adjustment program.
The government intends to rely on
the “participation of the private sector
through the provision of technology and
managerial skills” to reverse the flag
ging fortunes of the important export
crops, banana and sugar, and make a
new thrust in housing.17 In the area of
housing, the government seeks to enter
into joint-ventures with private reput
able companies to develop low and
middle-income homes. Two thousand
homes were scheduled for building in
1982 under this arrangement. The gov
ernment insists that “rent control
would remain as a means of protecting
the tenant” but as Minister of
Construction Bruce Golding warns:
.. .if the day should come when the
supply reached saturation point, then the
government would monitor the situation
arid if it demands, we will relax control

progressively. But the fa d that we cannot drain on the public purse.” The govern
deregulate now, does not negate our posi ment has also indicated that it will not
tion to deregulate in this sedion of the protect local businesses from foreign
competition and further that the “pro
economy when we can. . . 18
The Jamaican government has also cess of protection” they enjoyed under
placed a great deal of emphasis on the Manley government would be dis
attracting foreign investment. Accord continued. The Seaga administration
ing to Prime Minister Seaga, Jamaica has argued that by permitting the
received 408 “serious” investment pro importation of cheaper products, the
posals worth over US $550 million and cost of living will be reduced and the
requiring two and a half million square consumer also stands to benefit. As a
feet of factory space, as of September result, local producers faced with
1, 1981. The proposals represented an cheaper products would be forced into
employment potential of 25,000 per the production of products “which
sons and consisted of US $338 million
in foreign investment (embracing 244
projects) and US $218 million in local
investment (covering 164 projects).
Seaga’s first act as prime
And in an attempt to coordinate/conminister was to expel
solidate private sector and foreign
Cuban Ambassador
investment policies, the Private Sector
Ulises Estrada.
Organization of Jamaica (PSOJ) and a
Joint U.S./Jamaica Investment Com
mission were formed, and in June 1982
the government established an Advi
sory Council to the Minister of Industry
and Commerce “to further cooperation
between itself and the private sector”.
The Council was also charged with
monitoring “the implementation of
structural adjustment and economic have viable markets in which they can
restoration programmes, including the compete.”
deregulation of the economy.”19
In other words, the government has
adopted
what some political commenta
s mentioned, a major element
tors
have
termed “a policy of doctrin
of the governm ent’s free
aire
capitalism”.20
As one Jamaican col
enterprise policy is deregula
umnist
observes:
tion of the economy. This
“irrevocable” policy means that since
. . . (By this policy), the government
private enterprise can run business will deregulate the economy and phase out
more efficiently than government, then all the various restridions and licenses
the government would try to divest and red tape with which the Manley
itself of many public enterprises. For administration had entangled the private
example, by July 1981, six publicly- sector in its efforts to keep track of and
owned enterprises with total assets of control the flow o f scarce foreign ex
US $137 million were sold to the change. . .21
private sector by the government
The aim of deregulation was “to
Divestment Committee as a signal of
the government’s resolve that “govern make a radical switch from the importments should not run business enter substitution approach used for the past
prises.” It should be pointed out that 20 years to industrialization by export
these public companies were set up by orientation”.22 And to show that it
the PNP “in its attempts to control the meant business, the government an
nounced in July 1981 that “no licenses
commanding heights of the economy”.
The Seaga government is now argu at all would be needed to import certain
ing that since the combined losses from items” and in October 1982, 400 items
these and other statutory corporations were removed from the list of quan
totalled US $250 million over the past titative restrictions “because by and
five years, then, its policy of divestment large, they were not locally produced.”
represents “an effort to get rid of In addition, while the several hundred
uneconomic dead-wood which (is) a local and foreign investment applicants

A

were offered tax incentives for up to 10
years, they were not “granted protec
tion from competition as was the policy
in the past.”
The questions segments of the
private sector were asking were: Can
the relatively underdeveloped Jamaican
economy, shielded from foreign compe
tition for decades, withstand the impact
of the change? Can local manufacturers,
strangled by shortage of foreign ex
change to buy raw materials and bur
dened by inferior technology, compete
in terms of quality and prices with prod
ucts from high-powered transnationals?
However, foreseeing the tremendous
dislocations that could result from the
deregulation policy, the government ap
plied to the World Bank for a “struc
tural adjustment loan”, apparently to
provide the foreign exchange element
vital for the adjustment that had to be
made.
rime Minister Seaga has stated
that the special responsibility
in the structural adjustment of
the Jamaican economy was
transforming it from largely a domestic
productive sector to one that produced
for export. He adds that the basic objec
tive was to gear the manufacturing sec
tor for export so as to be a net earner of
foreign exchange. According to Seaga,
the process of structural adjustment
embodied deregulation, marketing and
incentives and the program was being
carried out on a very methodical and
systematic basis. He concludes by in
dicating that policies were put in place
to ensure markets and provide incen
tives and that the strategy of deregula
tion was devised to remove the restric
tions on certain consumer items.23
Nevertheless, some analysts have in
sisted that the government had to
implement aspects of the deregulation
program even before it received the
World Bank loan as a precondition to
convince the Bank that it was serious
about its new policy. In addition, the
U.S. business sector had also put pres
sure on the government to “free up the
market” again as a precondition for
U.S. private investment.

P

t should be pointed out here that
the Seaga government made a
serious mistake in opening up or
deregulating the Jamaican econ
omy so suddenly. This view has had

I
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widespread support in Jamaica. Manu
facturers and exporters associations
and the Workers Party of Jamaica were
among its supporters, while the
Jamaican business sector became indig
nant at the government’s deregulation
policy and the fact that it had tremen
dous difficulty in obtaining foreign ex
change for exports. According to R.
Anthony Williams, president of the
Jamaican Manufacturers Association,
“thirty-three factories have been closed
because of the problems spawned by
the governm ent’s (deregulation)
policy.”24 Also, staunch JLP supporter,
Gleaner columnist Carl Stone, warned
the government that when the Chilean
economy was opened up overnight in
the two-year period 1975-77, employ
ment in the manufacturing sector fell
by 18 percent due to uncontrolled com
petition from cheap imports. He went
on to ask:
. . . Why should the technocrats of the
World Bank ayid the IM F [International
Monetary Fund] be pressuring us to open
up the economy fully when in their own
countries protectionism is on the upswing
and none of these countries has opened up
beyond controlled competition?. . . 25
Another deleterious effect of this new
policy was that since industrial develop
ment in Jamaica was “established and
engineered for the protected local
market” during the 1950s and 1960s,
by removing that protection such a
policy (which was formulated in collu
sion with an IMF agreement) has had
serious effects on employment and
investment. And the eventual denoue
ment has been that the Jamaican econ
omy has become dominated by foreign
investors and a few rich Jamaicans—a
situation which existed in the 1960s26
during the JLP’s reign to the extent
that domestic and foreign capitalists
had such a field day that Jamaica came
to be known as the “new Riviera”. This
was the same situation the Manley
administration sought to rectify and in
which a massive brain drain of
Jamaican professionals and business
man to North America occurred, and
destabilization measures were taken
against his administration by the U.S.
government and the IMF.
And finally, the Seaga government
has indicated that its structural adjust
ment program is primarily based on the
NEW DIRECTIONS OCTOBER 1985

premise that an unfettered economy find the cupboard bare, we had to rebuild
will kindle orientation toward export a shattered economy laid waste by years of
production and create the resources inefficiency ami neglect, and to return the
necessary for economic and social country to a path o f growth after 8V2
development. The centerpiece of the years—just 18 months short of a decade—
structural adjustment is to gear the of declining production. . ,29
manufacturing sector to seek markets
In his report, the prime minister out
overseas as opposed to the import sub
lined the main achievements of his
stitution model that had been followed
government as follows:
since Jamaica began its industrializa
tion program in the late 1950s. This is
. . . We have restored a sense o f order,
to be backed up by the development of rationality and predictability to the coun
the export agricultural sector, particu- try’s life. By the same token we have
brought back confidence to the country
and hope in its future. Crime and violence
have been reduced and people no longer
the acute sense of personal insecurity
One must bear in mind have
that was for the most part the case in the
that there are at least
later years of the Seventies when there
two sides to every story. was the comistent fear o f attack from the
gunman, the crimiml and the “revolu
tionary.” We have put basic food items
and other necessities back on the shelves
and in continuing supply, ending the
anxiety of the housewife and the prosperi
ty of black marketeers trading in basic
human needs and profiting on the suffer
ing of shortages.
So too have we eased the shortages of
basic medical supplies and equipment
with more consistent flows as we move
larly the export of nontraditional towards fu ll restoration of services.
crops.27
We have turned around the economy,
registering positive growth, a distinctive
Impact of New Economic Policies
achievement against the negative back
ground
o f where we were coming from
When he became prime minister in
and
in
the
context o f the most punishing
1980, Edward Seaga stated that he
world
recession
in 50 years. In doing so,
inherited a nation that was “lurching
we
are
swimming
against the world tide
from crisis to crisis.” Two years later,
and gaining, while many, including the
he insisted that Jamaica has experi
enced an “economic miracle”, an “eco prosperous and powerful, are slipping.
nomic turn-around” through a policy of Only 5 of the more than 50 countries in
reliance on private enterprise. This, he this hemisphere are likely to show any
insists further, represents “change growth this year and Jamaica is one.
We have restored confidence in Jamaica
without chaos” and “a mammoth
among
the world’s financial institutions,
achievement.” Deputy Prime Minister
making
it possible for us to find the money
and Minister of Foreign Affairs and
for
Jamaica’
s development needs.
Foreign Trade, Hugh Shearer, also has
We
have
begun the diffiadt but essen
suggested that the Jamaican economy
tial
task
o
f
structurally adjusting our
had demonstrated positive growth rates
economy
for
future sustained growth
as a result of the “combination of a free
which
can
meet
competition and profit,
market economy supported by the
hot
lose,
by
it.
public sector and the entrepreneurial
We have created new investment starts
skills of an enlightened private
in
industry a)id agricidture in the econ
sector.”28 And in a report to Parliament
omy
at the rate of nearly eight per month
on the government’s second year in of
or
two
per week. When last did that ever
fice, Prime Minister Seaga said:
happen?
. . .[As] the first government in
We are laying the foundation for the
Jamaica’s history to come to office and recovery of our major agricultural crops,

introducing a spectacular range of new
crops, and providing the farmer with
abundance of credit and services. We have
turned around the crash in tourism to
prosperity for the economy and particu
larly for the workers.
We are bringing order to real estate
development and justice and equity to the
business o f rental o f premises.
We are bringing order into our public
transportation system to provide reliable
and reputable service. And, because we
dare to care about corruption in public life
we have initiated mechanisms to ensure
the integrity of the award of contracts
through the establishment o f an Insur
ance Placements Committee and the
appointment of a Contractor-General. . .
Because we dare to care about the young
we have created the H.E.A.R.T. Pro
gramme to give them the skills to “learn to
earn ’’for their future. We are building 50
primary schools because we dare to care
that a place in school should be the birth
right of every child.
We have introduced compulsory educa
tion because we dare to care that our
children shall not grow up crippled by
illiteracy.
Because we dare to care, we are estab
lishing a Golden Age Home to offer a
higher level of care for the aged helpless
and the poor. . .
In more specific and statistical terms,
he cited the following achievements.
(i) Real economic growth of 3.3 per
cent in 1981, 1.0 percent in 1982 and
1.7 percent for 1983, compared to an
annual average growth rate of minus
2.8 percent between 1973-80;
(ii) Agriculture grew by 3.5 percent in
1981, after an annual average growth
rate of minus 0.5 percent between
1973-80;
(iii) Manufacturing grew by 0.4 per
cent in 1981; after an annual average
growth rate of minus 3.6 percent be
tween 1973-80;
(iv) Construction grew in 1981 by 2.5
percent and by 26 percent in 1982; after
an annual average growth rate of minus
9.6 percent between 1973-80;
(v) Capital formation grew by 26 per
cent in 1981; after an annual average
growth rate of 6 percent between
1973-80;
(vi) Foreign exchange reserves annual
change (surplus) was 43.0 million in

goods was $283 million in 1981 or $31.3
million (i.e., 12.4 percent) more than the
1980 figure; in 1982 the figure in
creased to $325 million or by 15 per
cent.
There is no doubt that the achieve
ments outlined seem very impressive.
(viii) Investment which averaged in In addition they have been publicly
creases of 6.0 percent between 1973-80 lauded by the highest officials in the
jumped to 25.9 percent in 1981;
Reagan administration. The adminis
(ix) Arrears in payment for goods and tration has specifically praised the
services as of March 31, 1982 was zero; Seaga government for “its remarkable
compared to US $105 million in 1981 control of prices and the impressive
reduction in the cost of living index, as
well as the reduction of the budget
deficit ahead of schedule, the conserva
tive monetary policy, fiscal restraint
Jamaicans are beginning and the opening up of the economy to
to realize that conditions foreign (U.S.) investment”.

1981; after being a negative figure be
tween 1979-80;
(vii) Current account deficit averaged
minus 1.8 percent in 1981; after an
average of minus 4.0 percent between
1973-80;

in the country are getting
worse.

and US $50 million in 1980;
(x) Inflation fell from an annual aver
age of 22.0 percent between 1973-80 to
5.1 percent in 1981 but increased slight
ly to 6.9 percent in 1982;
(xi) Unemployynent dropped from 27.3
percent in 1980 to 25.8 percent in 1982;
(xii) Standard of Living Index improved
by 9.3 percent in 1981; after an annual
average deterioration of 3.6 percent
between 1973-80;
(xiii) Major aimes decreased by 8.3
percent in 1981; after an annual
average increase of 7.2 percent be
tween 1973-80;
(xiv) Industrial Relations climate im
proved by 4.0 percent in 1981; after an
annual average deterioration of 6.1 per
cent between 1973-80;
(xv) Domestic exports earnings in
creased from US $1.7 billion in 1980 to
US $1.8 billion in 1981;
(xvi) Gross revenue from tourism, which
declined dramatically between 1979
and 1980, brought in $280 million in
1981;
(xvii) Total exports of nontraditional

owever, one must bear in
mind that there are at least
two sides to every story. In
deed the dialectics of economic
progress in Jamaica suggest that the
picture isn’t as rosy as painted by the
government. The general contention is
that the government’s economic prog
nostications were overly optimistic.
In fact, during the past year, the gov
ernment had to revise its economic
forecasts downward and some pub
lished analyses have concluded that
“Jamaica Still Isn’t Making It”; that
“Seaga Is In Trouble”; and that there
“is a growing threat that the marginal
progress made during the past two
years has fueled expectations beyond
reason” to the extent that the govern
ment has used the marginal economic
fortunes “to mask the multitude of for
midable problems” facing the country
as a result of inappropriate economic
policies.30 In other words, deliberate at
tempts were made to make the Jamai
can people believe that their economic
situtaion appeared much better than it
really was.
A closer examination of the picture
on the other side of the economic coin
under the Seaga administration reveals
the following:
First, there was a price index increase
on “an annualized basis” of 4.7 percent
in 1981 over 1980 and an 8.4 percent in
crease in 1982 over 1981. As a result of
the November 1983 devaluation of 77
percent, gasoline prices increased from
J$6.00 to J$9.00 per gallon (i.e., US
$1.85 to US $2.74) by the end of 1983;

H
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of trade increase of US $300 million in
1980 to US $600 million in 1981. In
1982, the trade deficit was US $619
million. In 1983, total export earnings
fell by 10.8 percent. The country’s
balance of payments deficit now stands
at US $280 million, while the deficit on
current account is about US $550 mil
lion, reflecting an increase over the past
three years of almost 50 percent.
Fifth, the production o f bauxite, which
econd, domestic food production
is the main source of foreign exchange
declined by 19.2 percent dur
ing the first half of 1982 and
there was a 45 percent in
crease in food imports in 1981 over
1980 and a 17 percent hike during the
first half of 1982, compared to the same
period in 1981. In addition, the Jamai
can Agricultural Society (JAS) has criti
cized the government’s import policy
and has expressed fear that if the situa
tion continues “there is going to be
absolutely no production in agriculture
in Jamaica”. According to the JAS, “all
we hear is produce for exports, and
nobody is talking about producing for
local consumption”. What the JAS sug
gested is that the government conduct
“a massive educational drive to review
the trend of people preferring foreign
goods to local goods”. There should
also be proper presentation and packag
ing to appeal to local consumers. The
Seaga government has ignored this
policy advice because its stated policy
is to gear the Jamaican economy in the
colonial “export-basis” direction and
not meet the basic needs of the Jamai
can people. Emphasis is on satisfying
the American metropolitan market.
earnings and a major source of govern
Third, total external debt increased ment revenue, fell by 29.9 percent in
from US $1.4 billion between 1980-82 1982; the production of alumina also fell
to US $2.3 billion by the end of 1983. by about 23 percent; in addition, 1,500
This means that each Jamaican owes workers were laid off in the bauxite in
$1000 as his/her share of this debt. dustry in 1982. In 1981, Jamaica earned
Foreign debt now consumes 28 percent over $300 million from the export of
of all export earnings. Net foreign bauxite and alumina, but in 1982 earn
reserves stood at minus US $700 ings dropped to about $240 million.
million in 1982, compared to minus US This figure includes the U.S. stockpile
$574 million in 1981 and minus US purchase of $67 million worth of
$481.1 million in 1980. As a result, the Jamaican bauxite in September 1982.
national coffers are dry despite the
Sixth, Jainaica’s sugar industry is now
massive infusion of overseas loans and headed for bankruptcy as seven statethe fact that the government borrows owned mills have been forced to close.
The closing of these mills has meant the
about US $1.5 million per day.
Fourth, total imports in 1980 were US loss of jobs for 11,800 workers. Accor
$1.7 billion, while exports were US $1.4 ding to the National Sugar Company
billion; in 1981 total imports were US (NSC), the sugar industry lost $300 mil
$2.1 billion while exports were US $1.5 lion along with a $50 million additional
billion, that is, an unfavorable balance loss resulting from the drop in produc
public transportation and utility rates
(electricity) increased by 17-54 percent;
the price of milk went up by 40 cents.
Inflation hit a double-digit 16.7 percent
in 1983, after rising to only 6.5 percent
in 1982. As of October 1982, the Seaga
government’s own statistics showed
that 48 percent of Jamaica’s workers
earned less than JA $40.00 or US
$13.00 per week.
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tion in the last harvest. And to make
matters worse, the sugar industry was
severely hit by a foreign exchange
shortage which was precipitated by the
ill-advised implantation of a parallel
market for the exchange of convertible
currency by the government in Janu
ary 1983.
Seventh, conditions in Jamaica in 1982
were severe for the “ordinary people’’
in terms of their basic needs. For exam
ple, there were chronic shortages of

drugs and medical supplies in govern
ment hospitals and health centers;
water and flour shortages; electrical
black-outs; and inefficient bus transpor
tation and mail services.* These condi
tions were compounded by the laying
off of workers at the Kingston Trans
shipment Port at Port Bustamante and
at the Kingston Wharves Limited and
Western Terminals; the laying off of
workers by Reynolds Jamaica Mines;
and the surplus of employees of the Na
tional Sugar Group of Companies.
s a riposte against the govern
ment’s economic policies and
the progressively deteriorating
economic and human condi
tions, the Jamaican working class took
the following actions: (i) strikes by
Kingston dock workers, the sugar in-

A

dustry workers, the field workers in the
Frome factory, and the drivers and con
ductors who delivered mail to the rural
areas, (ii) protest demonstrations by the
government’s legal officers attached to
the courts, (iii) islandwide sick-outs by
registered nurses, ancillary workers
and psychiatric aides and, (iv) a slow
down by production workers at the
Seprod Group of Companies which pro
duces soaps, cooking oil, detergents,
commeal and animal feed.

tion open. The small manufacturers
have also described the government’s
credit policies as “not realistic”.
Eighth, in September 1982, the govern
ment had to revise its predicted 4 percent
growth rate downwards to a mere 1 per
cent because of declining productivity
in key sectors. In addition, confidential
projections by the government’s eco
nomic planners have indicated that
short term economic problems will
grow, viz, current account deficit is ex

The government paid no attention to
this gloomy warning. Approximately
six months later (October 1982), the
Ministry of Education announced a 50
percent cut in the 1982-83 operational
budget for new secondary schools. One
of the main functions of these schools
was to prepare students with market
able, technical skills. The budget cuts
left these vocational areas almost inop
erative and teachers expressed deep
concern for the future of the program.
The cuts served to further frustrate the
efforts of committed teachers, to drive 33
them from the classrooms and to
threaten the possible closing of some
schools. In a final attempt to salvage
this component of the country’s voca
tional program, the Association of Prin
cipals and Vice-Principals of these
schools sent a resolution to the Ministry
of Education. It stated, in part:
. . .Be it resolved that this association
views the attitude of the Ministry of Edu
cation as not in keeping with the best
interest of education as it affects these
schools, and be it further resolved that this
association urges the Ministry of Educa
tion to restore the operational budget of
new secondary schools even to the 1981-82
level forthwith so that some degree of nor
mality can be restored to the schools to pre
vent them from being closed...

In addition, local small manufacturers
were unhappy over the “government’s
insensitivity to (their) peculiar prob
lems.” They complained that they were
being “squeezed” out of business
because of a number of problems, not
the least among them being the govern
ment’s tendency to treat small-scale
enterprises as being on par with the
large-scale industrial and manufactur
ing giants who were able to fend for
themselves and needed no assistance.
As a result, several small factories, due
to financial difficulties, lack of raw
materials and import licenses, had to
open only seasonally for three weeks
during Easter and for special holidays
during which time they manufactured
as much of their particular product as
possible, then closed down the factory,
leaving only the retail or wholesale sec

pected to reach $274 million by 1986,
and the trade deficit could reach $562
million, forcing the government to
secure loans to cover a financial gap
that could increase from the current
$29.83 million to $97.7 million by 1986.
Ninth, conditions in the education
system have reached such a cancerous
state that Alfred Sangster, principal of
the College of Arts, Science and Tech
nology (CAST) warned the government
that the College was faced with “the
constant hemorrhage of qualified staff”
who left for the private sector “or
worse still to specially created quasi
government agencies with inflated
emoluments” and that the government
had to “come to terms with the condi
tions of service for its teachers or there
will shortly not be an educational
system on which to build any future.”

It must be pointed out that these
budget cuts by the Jamaican Ministry of
Education are analogous to the budget
cuts in educational and job-training pro
grams by the Reagan administration.
The net effects of these policies of the
two governments are that the budget
cuts “strike disproportionately and
severely at society’s poorest and most
dependent citizens” and “unfortunately
and un-intentionally” create “welfare
dependency” rather than produce the
kind of technically-skilled citizens who
can “pull themselves out of welfare
dependency” and atrophy.
enth, the managing director of
Estate Development Company
of the Ministry of Housing
has sta te d unequivocally
that “the country may never solve its
housing problems in this decade” and
that the most the government can hope
to achieve is to keep the problems
“under control and to an acceptable
degree”. The problems have been com
pounded by the fact that government
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policy has relied on the private sector to
be “the greatest provider of housing for
the people of the country”. The reality,
however, was the private sector only
showed interest in housing develop
ment as it concerned the upper-middle
and upper-income brackets. By so do
ing, they were able to maximize thenrates of return, with minimal invest
ment problems or risks. Government
policy has been oblivious to the many
Jamaican families who have been left
“homeless and without hope of owning
34 their own home”.
In 1982, the housing shortage in
Jamaica was 65,000 units. In addition,
rent and security of shelter for the peo
ple were number one priorities on the
public opinion polls.
The housing problem reached such a
critical stage that the opposition leader,
Michael Manley, was compelled to con
clude during his 1982 budget speech to
Parliament that “the government has
no housing policy.” Manley said that
the increases in the importation and the
production of construction materials
were not going towards building hous
ing for the poor, but were for commer
cial building and housing for the rich. In
addition, he said that existing housing
settlements were in an advanced state
of decay, social and economic infra
structure was missing from the devel
opments, rents were excessive, the
landlord-bailiff was the terror of poor
people and certain greedy private sec
tor developers were ripping off unfor
tunate house purchasers for non
existent schemes. He also indicated
that during his tenure “there were Rent
Laws establishing Rent Boards and
Community Tribunals to ensure fanrent for tenants and fair treatments by
landlords. Rents were rolled back in
many cases.”
anley further stated that be
tween 1976 and 1980, the Na
tional Housing Trust (NHT)
built over 17,381 housing
units, but in the first two years since the
Seaga government took office, only
1,100 housing units were started. The
NHT was created during the Manley
administration “to mobilize workers’
savings to provide them with housing
on an income-related basis.” Emphasis
was on providing low and middle in
come housing.
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Eleventh, the government has been
publicly accused of “contradicting
employment figures for the island”.
According to Manley, Prime Minister
Seaga has indicated that in 1981 his
administration reduced unemployment
by 0.6 percent since taking office. In
other words, the government boasts
that unemployment stood at 26 percent
in 1981 implying that that figure was 32
percent when Seaga came into office.
However, Manley has indicated that if
that’s the case, then the prime minister
was guilty of “gross dishonesty”
because “unemployment figures are
taken in April and October of each year.
The unemployment figure for Novem
ber 1980 was 26.8 percent”.
In reality, official records have re
vealed that the level of unemployment
actually increased from 261,500 to
280,700 over the period October 1981
to April 1982. It stood at the end at 27
percent. This represented a 1.4 percent
increase in the jobless rate over the
period. The government’s own Depart
ment of Statistics also has shown that
the unemployment rate increased from
26.2 percent to 27 percent between
April 1981 and April 1982. The
unemployment rate among women in
April 1982 was 43.1 percent, up from
42.9 percent since October 1981. The
rate among men stood at 15.3 percent,
an increase of 1.1 percent since October
1981. At the end of 1983, unemploy
ment officially stood at 27 percent or
over 300,000 Jamaicans out of work in
spite of the government’s boasts of
economic recovery and new jobs.

recovery.” As the pro-government Daily
Gleaner concurs: “not until this problem
(unemployment) is solved, can Seaga
regard his government as successful.”
Twelfth, another glaring testimony of
the negative detrimental impact of the
Seaga government’s policies is in the
area of migration (brain drain) of thou
sands of Jamaicans to the United
States. Jamaicans have become so
frustrated with their government’s
policies that they have resorted to ille
gal entry into the United States by
means of forged U.S. birth certificates.
It is very instructive to recall that
conventional wisdom once suggested
that thousands of qualified, professional
and middle-income Jamaicans left the
country when the Manley administra
tion adopted its policy of Democratic
Socialism in 1974 as a means to meet
the basic needs of the broad masses of
the Jamaican people. Ironically, in
1982, several thousands of poor disen
chanted low-income Jamaicans left the
country because of the pro-U.S. busi
ness, private enterprise (sector) and
non-Jamaican orientation of its govern
ment’s policies.
In examining the startlingly high rate
of migration, it was uncovered that 100
permanent visas and 400 non-perma
nent visas were granted daily. On an ag
gregate basis, this means that each year
36,000 Jamaicans have been leaving the
country permanently for the United
States.
inally, it is again instructive to
recall that during the 1980
general elections, the JLP cam
paigned and won on the slogan
that the “poor can’t take no more.”
Since taking office, however, the ruling
JLP government has concluded that, in
deed, the poor can take some more.
Thirteenth, juxtaposed to the twin
problems of chronic high unemploy
ment and migration is the “moral mess”
that has permeated all aspects of life in
Jamaica under the Seaga government.
Church ministers have publicly warned
the government that “no nation that
kicks morality overboard can survive”
while in an editorial in The Jamaica Daily
News (December 29, 1982), Jean
Jackson surmises:

F

The mood of the country, therefore,
is that the unemployment rate has
reached “catastrophic proportions.”
The general contention is that by put
ting the entire responsibility in the
hands of the private sector, the “gov
ernment accepts no responsibility itself
for indicating and implementing pro
grams which will have the effect of
creating direct employment.” There
also has been a clarion call for a “Na
tional Objective” to reduce the unem
ployment rate to two or three percent
because unemployment is seen “as the
root cause of several other problems.”
In addition, the opposition party has
called upon the government “to pub
. . . Looking back at the year 1982, it
licly state what it is doing to reverse this
alarming rise in unemployment while seems that the focus ivas on the material;
we are supposed to be in a period of the emphasis on the tangible to the exclu-

sion of the intangible; on the ability to beat
any and every system to satisfy the wants
of the individual; on judging the worth of
a person by the outward signs o f prosperity
with very little attention to the intrinsic
values o f life (and morality). . .
or many Jamaicans, 1983 was to
have been “the year of deliver
ance”. Instead it has become a
year of doubt, uncertainty, and
chaos, combining an unprecedented
one-party state apparatus with a
recession-riddled economy. The situa
tion is very volatile. Seaga campaigned
on the slogan of deliverance from what
he then charged were eight years of
mismanagement and leftist policies of
the Manley government that had left
the economy in shambles. He pleaded
with the citizenry to give him only three
years to turn the economy around. But
after three years, many Jamaicans are
convinced that their deliverance is not
near, but far, far away.
□
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